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T14E COURT 6P' APPEALS, 194 TERM
theories for cancellation of notice for failure to serve within the statutory time
limit have been advanced,3 3 the doctrine that failure to so serve is a form of
unreasonable neglect to proceed, and the court in its discretion may cancel,34 has
prevailed.35 The Court here did not decide this question, because here the can-
cellation was by consent, but it hinted that it was not satisfied that this was the
correct test, saying that the unreasonable neglect to proceed dealt with in C.P.A.
§123 applies only where an action has been commenced; i.e., a summons has been
served. .3
It has also been a general rule, if lis pendens has been cancelled because of
failure to commence an action, that another one cannot be filed.37 The underlying
theory is that the cancellation was an adjudication on the subject and determined
the rights of the parties in so far as they could be affected by the filing of a notice
of pendency. Otherwise, the statute would be negated,3 8 and hardship and injustice
would result.3 9 The decision in this case affirmed the existing rule disallowing
refiling after a cancellation has been effected, but has left confused the question of
whether such cancellation is mandatory or discretionary.
Prima Fade Case
When the plaintiff makes out a prima fade case and an appellate court
reverses on the ground that the jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence a
new trial must be granted. A dismissal of the complaint does not lie4" when the
plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right.41 Thus, a final judgment on
findings contrary to those made by the jury can not be given in such situations.42
In non-jury cases a reversal and dismissal is possible,43 but new findings of fact
are necessary."4
33. Note 3, supra. Lipschitz v. Watson, 113 App. Div. 408, 99 N. Y. Supp 418
(2d Dep't 1906).
34. Civil Practice Act §123.
35. Cohn v. Ratkowslcy, 43 App. Div. 196, 59 N. Y. Supp. 344 (1st Dep't 1899);
Lipschutz v. Horton, 55 Misc. 44, 104 N. Y. Supp. 850 (1907); Bhostack v. Haslcell,
116 Misc. 475, 190 N. Y. Supp. 174 (1921); Levy v. Kon, 114 App. Div. 795, 100 N. Y.
Supp. 205 (2d Dep't 1906); Nassau Lake Realty v. Hilts, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 216 (1951).
36. Civil Practice Act §218.
37. Shostack v. Haskell, note 35, supra,
38. ohen v. Ratkcowsky, note 35, supra.
39. Lipschutz v. Horton, note 35, supra.
40. Caldwell v. Nicolson, 235 N. Y. 209, 139 N. E. 243 (1923).
41. New York State Costitution, Art. I, sec. 2.
42. Imbrey v. Prudential Insurance Co., 286 N. Y. 434, 36 N. E. 2d 651 (1941);
N. Y. CONST., C. P. A. §584 (1).
43. NEw YoRK STATE CONsTITUTIoN, Art. 6 sec. 8; C. P. A. §584.
44. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 239.
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This rule was reaffirmed by the court in Sagorsky v. Malyon,4 an action on a
policy by insureds against the insurer of property. If the loss occurred while the
property was in or upon an automobile unattended by the insured, his permanent
employee, or a person whose sole duty it was to attend the auto, there was no
coverage. The loss occurred while the plaintiff's car was parked in a public garage
attended by an employee of that garage. The Court held, a prima facie case had
been established by application of the rule that facts adduced at the trial are to be
considered in the aspect most favorable to the plaintiff, who is entitled to every
favorable inference which can reasonably be drawn from those facts.40 Thus, they
reversed the Appellate Division47 (which found the jury verdict to be against the
weight of the evidence and dismissed the complaint) and granted a new trial.
The two dissenters felt that no evidence raising a question of fact had been
presented, so a dismissal was proper 48, this in spite of the Appellate Division's
wording that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. They would have
dismissed the complaint having found as a matter of law that the trial court com-
mitted error in failing to grant defendant's motions for dismissal of the complaint
and directed verdict.
Res Adjudicafa
Where access to premises was ordered by mandatory injunction against tenant,
a later suit by the landlord for damages arising out of the same transaction was
barred as res adjudicata.49 The rule is that where a cause of action has been finally
adjudicated on its merits, it is final as to all matters which might have been litigated
as well as those actually litigated.5 0 Since plaintiff could have demanded damages
in the injunction action, he was precluded from a suit for damages in a later
action.51 This follows from the fact that the distinction between law and equity
has been abolished in this state;52 this was a "violation of but one right by a single
legal wrong. 53
45. 307 N. Y. 584, 123 N. E. 2d 79 (1955).
46. Osipoff v. Cityj of New York, 286 N. Y. 422, 36 N. E. 2d 646 (1941); DeWald
v. Seidenberg, 297 N. Y. 335, 79 N. E. 2d 430 (1948).
47. 283 App. Div. 859, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 900 (Ist Dep't 1954).
48. DeWald v. Seidenberg, note 46 supra.
49. Mafio Holding Corp. v. S. J. Blume Inc., 308 N. Y. 570, 127 N. E. 2d 558(1955).
50. Schuycill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg R. Corp., 250 N. Y. 304, 165 N. E.
456 (1929).
51. Interlied v Whaley, 85 Hun. 63, 32 N. Y. Supp. 640 (4th Dep't 1895); aff'd.,
156 N. Y. 658, 50 N. E. 1118 (1898); HahZ v. Sugo, 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135(1901).
52. Civil Practice Act §8.
53. DeCross v. Turner & Blanchard Inc., 267 N. Y. 207, 211; 196 N. E. 28, 30
(1935).
